After the Battle by Schulze, Wilhelm
AFTER THE BATTLE
By WILHELM SCHULZE
The author i4 hlolC1l kJ our readerll frrmo Ilel1U'lJl conIribuJion.'l to thi magazine.
amoll(J them I,ia hUl1lorOUI/ "Lt. Col. Uhrooll. P.R.O." He i4 one oj 1M OWIlI4,tdin!l
(leNnon fleWllmen in Eallt Ana today. ]'lr. Schulze wa.t rece,~ly among a I1l1wll
group of Joreign correllpOftdenu who were offered the firllC Cha,IIU to villu the a,rWi/
cOllqUtred or pt!acsJully included by Japcm into the Co.PrOlJX!rity Spltere a liule
Ol'er a year ago.
In the following fKJfJU we are publillllin(J /lome oj e1Ie notu wllic/. he wrote
during hill tri,1'. Tiley a ..e the vivid imp..elllliolll/ of all e%pf!..ieflced ;o,~malillt who
Iwlt Iraillw Mlni/el] immediauly to obllel'Ve what i4 important Q'nd to captu..e ill a Jew
word" what u took days or u'eeka to I/u.-K.M.
SAIGOK
SAIGON is a typical little Frenchprovinoial town. With ita neathouses, its tidy little shops, its
attractive window displays, its sidewalk
cafes, and its French people who, although
they form only a tiny minority, dominate
the appElarance of the streets in the
center of the town, Saigon radiates lei-
surely quiet and a European charm which
can be found nowhere else in the East.
Nevertheless, although war has not
touched the city directly, it has deeply
affected the lives of its inhabitants.
Behind the window displays yawn empty
shelves, and stores which continue to do
business are selling out their stocks or deal-
ing in local goods. Behind the Frenohman
who argues with the native waiter in the
cafe over the temperature of his drink and
still manages to show typical French
temperament in doing this, there looms
the anxiety for his livelihood tomorrow.
And behind the women-and this is also
a sign of the times that should not be
disregarded in one's judgment of the
situation-there looms the question of
how their chic is to be maintained to-
morrow, when a bottle of perfume (from
France, of course) is only to be had on
the black market for a hundred and fifty
piastres.
They still drive their own car~ in
Saigon, and these have not been con-
verted to the use of charcoal. But
instead they run on alcohol made from
rice, and this alcohol eats away parts of
the motor, 80 that they can just about
figure out how long they will be able to
enjoy the pleasure of mot{)ring. They
have no lubricating oil. But they
found a way out by turning the huge
catch of their fishing industry into lubri-
cating oil. For the time being they still
have enough leather, but a scarcity of
tanning material is beginning to be felt.
What is still there in abundance is gold,
precious stones, silk, rice, meat, and fruit.
Will the Freneh in Saigon be able to
re-create, with these things and with the
available abundance of native labor, that
style of living for which people were
willing to go out to the colonies?
Once you have touched upon these
problems in conversation, e~en super-
ficially, you know that your first carefree
impression of this town is not neces.'~arily
the final or correct one. Banners across
the width of Rue Cadinat ",;th their
appeals to patriotism, and the acknowl-
edgment indirectly revealed by them
that the citizens of Saigon are by no
mean united, supply further indications
of the worries weighing upon the town.
Outwardly, the problem Dc Gaulle or
Petam seems settled, since the Japanese
victories in Malaya, the Philippines, and
the Netherlands East Indies have proved
Petain s policy to ha,,"e been right. But
AJTER THE BATrLE 333
in the harbor of Saigon lies the whole
French East Asiatic Beet, and no one oan
say what the feelings are with which the
French people look upon this fleet.
Their new Japanese co-citizens, how-
ever, are looked upon with absolute legal
correctness, &8 can be seen on every
occasion. In a prolonged interview
granted us by the Japanese Minister who,
under Ambassador Yoshizawa, heads the
diplomatic branoh at Saigon, we were
told that Franco-Japanese relations had
been entirely settled on the basis of
military, economic, and commercial agree-
ments, which determined these relations.
In the same way, every Frenchman
regards Franco-Japanese relations as a
purely legal affair that has been olarified
and outlined.
When on arrival from the airfield we
entered the dining room of the Nippon
Hotel, which was formerly known &8 the
Majestic Hotel, we were surprised at the
sensation our appearance caused among
the Annamite waitresses. Behind every
column and every screen they stood
giggling and laughing, watching us from
their hiding places. At first we were apt
to regard this ouriosity and more than
friendly interest as part of the Annamite
character. But we soon found out that
we were actually the first European
guests of the Nippon Hotel since it had
been taken over by the Japanese quite
80me time ago.
Except when they meet in the COU1'8e
of duty, they live striotly apart from one
another, these Frenchmen from an earlier
period of French history and their co-
citizens who have brought a new age
with them. This living side by side with
each other is facilitated by the faot that
the Japanese have brought their own
time from Tokyo and that the French
have kept to their old time, whioh lags
two hours behind that of Tokyo. When
the Japanese have already finished break-
fast, the French are just getting up.
When the Frenchman goes to have his
customary aperitif, the Japanese is just
leaving the cafe to have his supper.
French midnight and closing time of the
restaurants find the Japanese already fast
&8leep on his futong.
What is the future that Indo-China
faces? It would be presumptuous to
indulge in prophecies. But a remark
made by the Japanese Minister in this
connection, although not applied directly
to this question. deserves to be remem-
bered. Japan's victory, he sUd, is the
key to all events and developments in
Indo-China. This victory must be com-
plete and must have resulted in peace
before Indo-China's role within the oom-
ing Greater East Asia can be determined.
There can be no doubt that this role
will have to be played within Greater
Eaat Asia and never again outside of this
sphere. Indo-China may still and for
ever afterwards, as in her purely French
past, be the only country in East Asia
to drive on the right-hand side of the
road; but the Japan6!e will see to it that,
within the total area of their sphere,
Indo-China drives properly.
SHONAN
While writing these lines, I am sitting
on the wide terrace of the former Seaview
Hotel, which the Japanese hne renamed
Nanmeikaku and turned into officers'
quarters. In front of the Opt'U door
there stretches into the darkness, faintly
illuminated by a single sta.r, the Strait of
Singapore; not even the form"r Dlltch Rllio
archipelago lying opposite can be m~de
out. A M'l.layan waiter wanderzJ up and
down th", lawn, ready at a m'lm,nt's
notice to bring m" te~ or get m3 my
cigarettes. Tiny mosquitoes hover around
my hands and feet. It is a typical tropic
night, and we have had a hard, hot day.
This afternoon we went to see the last
fortifioati oDS which the British had hur-
riedly constructed on the south ooast of
Singapore: good, strong field positions
with triple barbed-wire entanglements
reaching into the 88& and with a few
sturdy pillboxes. Once again, as 80 often
during the last few days, we shook our
hea.-u and wondered: Why? Why at
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the last moment did they have to con-
struct fortifications towards the south of
all places, when it was an absolute certain-
ty that the enemy would approach from
the north, from the land1
Several days ago we stood on the
observation tower of the palace of the
Sultan of Johore and looked out over the
battlefield from the same spot from
which General Yamashita directed the
Japanese operation of crossing over to
Singapore Island. Every point of the
battlefield as far as the hill of Bukit
Timah and the famous Ford factory
where the capitulation was signed could
be clearly seen from there. That W88 the
first time we shook our heads and asked
what had stopped the British from de-
stroying the tower before they retreated
from the mainland. For although they
could not know with absolute certainty
that General Yamashita would use it as
his point of command, even the youngest
British artillery officer should have been
aware of the fact that this tower W88
a splendid vantage point for artillery
observation. But no, they left it
standing; and, even after the battle
had begun and the crossing had
started, not a single British shell landed
within miles of the tower.
We drove across the famous Johore
causeway, and gaps in the railing dis-
closed that the blasting so much talked
about at that time had destroyed hardly
a hundred feet of the causeway. Later,
the British directed heavy fire at the
causeway, and the Japanese suffered
losses when they filled in the gap in
forty-eight hours. But again the ques-
tion arose, why the British had not
blown up the whole causeway or at least
a piece five or ten times as big. There
could surely have been no lack of ex-
plosives.
Following tho route across the island
taken by the Japanese during the battle,
we reached Bukit Timah Hill. A glance
at a map will show even the layman that,
with the loss of this position, the situation
would become untenable for the British.
So it was here that the battle had to be
fought, that every muscle had to be
strained for defense. But today th&
traces of this fighting have practically
disappeared. On the hill, which was
doubtless bitterly defended, there is now
a Japanese monument to the fallen sons
of Nippon, and slightly below it a monu-
ment to fallen Englishmen, Scotsmen,
and Australians. Australian prisoners of
war have cleaned up the area here so
that you hardly notice anything of the
battle. But even the entire surroundings,
which you would expect to be pock-
marked with shell craters, have in reality
hardly been touched.
A few miles further south, however, on
Kappel Hill, the picture is still a terrible
one. You need no explanations to realize
that here, at the very gates of Singapore,
t,he battle actually raged in the true sense
of the word and that the defenders really
fought here-when it was already much
too late to save the island fortress. All
the reserves which were saved up at
Bukit Timah or sent too late had to shed
their blood here when there was no
longer the slightest chance of their
sacrifices having any meaning. Why?
This question a,rose over and over
again.
It grew to almost terrifying proportions
when we went to see Seletar, the actual
British naval port. The generosity of
the Japanese allowed us to inspect it in
all its details, perhaps to show us that
Seletar was in reality only a third-rate
base and that all the British' claims about
the strength of this base had been nothing
but bluff. It is true that, before their
retreat, the British damaged the drydock.
sank the floating dock, and demolished
the giant crane that could lift 250 tons.
But when the Japanese approached the
naval port they evacuated it 'without
fighting. Vast storehouses, warehouses,
and workshops with steel presses and all
kinds of other modern machinery fell
undamaged into Japanese hands; and,
since the Japanese themselves had, in the
hope of entering it soon, spared the naval
port as much as possible and hardly
bombed it, the Japanese fleet could enter
it a few days after the cessation of hostili-
ties. The drydock has long been func-
AFTER THE BATTLE 365
tioning &gain, and the floating dock, too,
will soon be in use once more.
Last but not least in this series of
"why's" come those raised by the sight
of the prisoners of war, whom we meet
at every step. The Japanese allow them
to go about freely, so to speak. There is
no escape for them, even if they should
plan to escape. But in no face could
we read the desire for flight. In spite of
all Eden's propaganda it can be said, for
the consolation of Engli~h, Scottish, and
Australian mothers, wives, and sweet-
hearts, that not only do they look very
well fed and healthy, but that they are
obviously quite content with their lot.
For reasons of comfort they dress only in
hat, shorts, and boots. Even without
the proffered cigarettes, we could have
easily drawn them into conversation.
But the question as to "why" would
certainly not have been answered correctly
by them. There had been more than a
hundred thousand of them opposing a
bare thirty thousand Japanese. They had
been strong and healthy, weU equipped
and carefuUy trained. Why should
they feel inclined today to give the correct
answer to the qucstion?
I do not even know whether I shall be
able to give the proper answer, although
I feel that I know it. It is certainly to
be found in part in the Brit,ish under-
estimation of the enemy and: ,also in part
in their confidence of being' able later t9.
make up for po8sible".eaFly 1988es. eel'=-
tainly another part of, the anSwer is to be
found in the differenc~$of.opinion between
the British Army apd the British Navy
which, according to .Ja.panese observation,
were never properly co-ordinated. Un-
doubtedly, the loss of the Prince of Jrale.j
and the Repulse had a demoralizing effect
on the British Navy; and the flight of the
remaining British fleet from Seletar, even
before the actual battle for Singapore had
begun, in tum deeply affected the morale
of the British Army. But aU this does
not explain the British actions, the British
defeat, and the British collapse, just 8S
the poor quality of the British command
in the actual fighting does not sufficiently
explain everything, although this com-
mand was a rank disgrace.
I believe that the answer to all these
"why's" must be sought elsewhere, and
I think I found it several nights ago when
I went in search of a cold bottle of beer
and landed in the Singapore Swimming
Club. This is a place that is hardly
surpassed anywhere in the world. It is
worthy of those vast palaces of com-
merce which, in the center of Singapore,
form such a monstrous contrast to the
cruel poverty of their surroundings. It is
a token of English luxury such as cannot
be found better or more impressive
even in London. Designed in complete
harmony and in a setting of exquisite
beauty, the buildings and the pool ha.ve a
dreamlike, almost unbearable loveliness.
Those who have seen this swimming
club must regard it as the crowning
achievement of British wealth in Singapore
and must admit with envy that its mem-
bers knew how to live well. But they
did not know how to die, and they never
grasped that one must be able to die in
order to win life. They fought as they
used to play, and it never occurred to
them that total war could be anything
but good sport. And, starting with
them, thousands of troops whom they
commanded knew even less why they
should let themselves be killed by the
Japanese. This is true above all for the
Indians and Malayans under British
command. But this is at least equally
true, although in a somewhat different
form, for the Australian "Diggers," for
the London "Cockneys," and for the
Scottish "Highlanders," who were never
allowed to enter the Swimming Club.
There may have been many individual
brave soldiers in the British Army. But
if the leadership was inadequate, bad, or
even abominable, the entire army was at
least in the same degn,-e uninterested,
indifferent, or intent on staying alive.
What did England, the Empire, and
what, after all, did ~ingapore matterT
That must have been more or less the
attitude of English, Scottish and, above
aU, Australian soldiers. To this day
the surviving officers and men in their
robust health have not grasped that
with Singapore they lost more than a
fortress, a colony. or even an empire.
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BELAWAN-DELI
Yesterday afternoon we landed in
Medan. In contrast to the traditional
notion of Sumatra and the cannibals
which inhabited it until a hundred years
ago, we found Madan to be a clean,
comfortable little town whose hotel and
streets, even its Chinese quarter and
pleasure parks, still radiated typical Dutch
cleanliness.
The motorcar that took us this morning
through streets with rows of gray-painted
houses-incidentally, this was the only
defense measure taken by the Dutch up
to the occupation, although they had
more than two months' time after the
outbreak of war--soon turned towards
the suburbs and ended its journey of
some twelve miles in front of a. plain,
unadorned wooden shed. Inside this
shed, 80 young lieutenant began by show-
ing us some photographs. One photo
showed a quay more than half a mile
long which was torn open everywhere by
blastings. Another photo showed a bat-
tery of palm-oil tanks, perhaps 8t'veral
dozen at various places, but all of them
completely burnt out. Photos of sunk
ahips followed upon photos of burnt-
down warehoU8Cs. Blown-up railway
yards rounded off the impression of the
whole: namely, that the Dutch, before
evacuating Belawan-Deli, had really de-
stroyed everything that could be of use
to the Japanese. After having seen all
these photographs I can well imagine
that the Dutch were convinced that they
had rendered this port useless to the
Japanese for at least five years. In-
cidentally, one third of the entire imports
and exports of Sumatra passed through
here before the' war.
But, impressive as were the photos, the
gesture with which the )'oung Japanese
lieutenant opened the door of the shed
to expose the port of Belawan-Deli as it
is today was equally impressive. Before
our eyes stretohed the quay as far as it,
had ever stretched, bordered on one aide
by the river and on the other by ware-
houses, railroad tracks, and pipe lines.
In the ri"er we could still discern a few
wrecks, for the Dutch sank almost 80,000
tons of shipping here. But the shipping
channel wound its broad, unimpeded way
through the few remaining obstacles. We
were taken through the tank installa-
tions, and only military necessity forbids
us to say how many of the 92 destroyed
tanks have been filled with palm oil again.
We saw a sawmill that answered all
t,he requirements of our Japanese lieu-
tenant; we saw a. small drvdock that he
had hauled out of the w~ter again and
which now held two Chinese junks; and
we finally saw the bathhouse built by the
Japanese for the native workmen and of
which the Dutch, in spite of their clean-
liness, had never thought. Everything
was permeated by the noise of happy
labor. The atmosphere was almost like
that of a fair among the crowding, hurry-
ing, and yet laughing workmen.
I have had dozens of opportunities
to see Japanese reconstruction work
in detail, in large things as in
small. But the impression made upon
me by the work of that young
Japanese lieutenant in Belawan-Deli
was not approached even by Djawa.
Nowhere else has the will for recon-
struction triumphed so unequivocally over
the will for destruotion. No more drastic
effect can be imagined than for the
Japanese to let that Dutchman who was
responsible for the work of destruction
see Belawan-Deli as it is today. I should
like to see the surprise in his face when
he realizes for how few months he has
been able to hold up the Japanese in their
economic progress. when he had believed
to have stopped them once and for all
from using tlus port.
DJAWA
To the best of my knowledge I can
state that, in the months before the out~
break of the Greater East Asia War, the
Japanese were far removed from the
thought of pocketing the Dutch colonial
empire. They would have been more
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than satisfied if Indonesia, as a geograph-
ical part of East Asia, had boon at their
disposal, as it was at that of the Dutch,
the British, and tho Americans, as a
supplier, and if they, like the Dutch, the
British, and tho Americans, ha-<1 been
allowed to aoquire some of its wealth in
rubber, oil, etc., on a normal commercial
basis. Before the war the Japanese sent
to Batavia, first the Minister of Com-
merce Kobayashi and, after the failure
of his mission, the old, experienced
diplomat Yoshizawa. At this stage of
East Asiatic politics, the Japanese would
<:ertainly not have quibbled over money
and the prices for Indonesian products.
They would have accepted any oonditions,
as long as the Netherlands East Indies
had only supplied.
But to recapitulate in a few words:
The Dutch, who had once been in dread
as to whether England or America would
he the first to swallow them, had at this
juncture already once and for all gambled
away their fat.c. In the present world
conflict, they had definitely staked their
all on the Anglo-American card and were
no longer the masters of their decisions.
They let, first Kobayashi, then Yoshizawa,
go home without any results. They went
over with all they had to the "ABeD"
front. And even after the Greater East
Asia War had already started, they
laughed at the final Japanese offer to
ensure their existence by maintaining
neutrality. They had the reputation of
being shrewd businessmen, and their
calculations must have led them to the
conviction that Japan could never win a
war against England and America. And
this is where they proved themselves to
be poor calculators.
But they were not only poor calcula-
tors: they were real gamblers; for, in
joining the "ABeD" front they must
have believed that this act was all that
was necessary for safeguarding their
country. During the last few days I
have traveled by car all over Djawa.
I h&ve had all the battles fought on
Djawa. explained to me by Japanese
officers. I have inspectt'd all the defense
positions prepared by the Dut,ch. The
result is devastating. I can only state
that the Dutch made nothing but the
very slightest efforts on their own part
to face a possible enemy and ward him
off. This they seemed to regard &8 a
job for the Anglo-Saxons.
I have seen the defense system of
Surabaya, and I was told the course of
the battle by a young Japanese lieutenant
who participated in it. In a terrain that
actually offered excellent possibilities for
defense, there were a fow dozen weak,
unconnected pillboxes which were pro-
tected only by a narrow river. During
my inspection, there were some Japanese
troops practising attacks on old, ruined
pillboxes, and little imagination wa-s
nooded to conjure up the past reality.
"Wben we had just got that far," observed
the young lieutenant with a gesture to-
wards the maneuvering troops, "a Dutoh
flag of truce appeared and sa",ed us fur-
ther trouble."
Starting from the airfield of Kalidjati,
where the final capitulation of the Dutch
troops was signed in the plain, sturdy
house of the chief flying instructor after
only eight days of fighting, I visited the
battlefield between Bandoong and Bata-
via. High, dominating hills should have
given the Dutch the opportunity of hold-
ing out for weeks. And indeed, &8 is to
be seen from trenches dug by the Japanese
in front of the Dutch positions, there
was comparatively severe fighting at some
plaoes. But the battle was lost. Why?
At first, when the Dutch heard that
the Japanese had landed on the west
coast of Djawa, they concentrated their
main forces there. When the seoond
landing in central Djawa ncar Kalidjati
was reported, the Dutch hurriedly re-
grouped their forces. And finally, when
the Japanese who had landed at Kalidjati
began to attack, they took this to be the
main battle, although the Japanese were
far outnumbered, and held up their hands
as soon as the Dutch tanks had been
destroyed by Japanese planes. Actual
fighting between infantry troops took
place in Djawa only sporadically, by
chance, so to speak, and never according
to plan or decisively.
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Before the outbreak of the war, the
Japanese would have been glad to give
even future Dutch generations an oppor-
tunity to enjoy the wealth of Djawa.
They would doubtless have taken into
the bargain the fact that Netherlanders
would have continued to live in the
beautiful towns of Djawa for an unlimited
period, if the Dutch East Indies had only
shown the least inclination to meet
Japanese commercial and economic de-
sires halfway. At the beginning of the
Greater East Asia War things were
already difficult enough for the Japanese
even without the participation of the
NetherhUlds East Indies. The Japanese
had no reason to make it more difficult
by forcing Holland to take part. But
Dutch obstinacy and selfishness frustrated
this solution, and today there is surely
no one in the world who regards the fall
of the Netherlands East Indies as being
more final and who has struck out more
definitely on new paths in the adminis-
tration of Djawa than the Japanese oc-
cupation troops. From the head of the
military administration down to the
simplest private, no one thinks of Djawa
as an "occupied area." The conviction
that Djawa has definitely become a. part
of the Co-Prosperity Sphere is such a
matter of course that temporary measures
such as are still necessary elsewhere in
Japanese occupied areas are not even
considered here.
Of course, the solid foundation laid by
the Dutch in their administration and the
fact that the natives really desire to co-
operate with Japan for the future, have
facilitated the work of reconstruction in
those districts and economic areas which
have been affected by the war-and there
are not many of them. On principle, the
Dutch in their work of destruction spared
residential quarters, so that the Japanese
administration has no worries
regarding housing, feeding, and
employment. The Dutch brought
factories to a standstill by
making them useless through carrying
away important parts of machinery.
But these factories are working again
today, as I saw for myself. The Japanese
provincial governor of Surabaya told me
that all of them were running again three
months after Djawa had been occupied,
for the native workmen brought back the
hidden parts of machinery, disclOl~ing the
hiding places in their own interests.
Indeed, in dozons of cases the factories
are today once more under the old Dutch
management, the only difference being
that the Dutchmen now wear armbands
with the Rising Sun and that important
decisions must be okayed by the Japanese
supervisor. In the former Hotel des Indes
in Batavia, which has lost none of its
beauty through the war, a Dutchman
asked me to remember him to a mutual
acquaintance in Tokyo. When I in turn
asked from whom the message was, he
replied with an embarrassed smile: "From
the former manager of this hotel." The
word "former" held everything that was-
to be said.
Since May of last year, the Japanese
army in Djawa has been feeding and
clothing itself from the country's prod-
ucts and has been receiving no supplies-
whatever from Japan. Since May of last.
year, the traces of war have been sys-
tematically obliterated, so that a traveler-
already has difficulty in finding them.
Personally, I shall always remember the
wide avenue in front of the Governor's
Palace in the world-famous botanical
gardens at Buitenzorg, where two ancient
cannons from the seventeenth century
are mount.ed, as if they were to protect
all the wealth and beauty of this country.
These two cannons have gradually taken
on a symbolic character for me during
this journey. At any rate, they do not
seem suitable guardians for a pa.radise.
For that one must look for bet-
ter protection, even if it should
be more costly than two old.
souvenir cannons.
